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Abstract— It is known that the exchange of information 
between web applications is done by means of the SOAP 
protocol. Securing this protocol is obviously a vital issue for any 
computer network. However, when it comes to cloud computing 
systems, the sensitivity of this issue rises, as the clients of system, 
release their data to the cloud.  
XML signature is employed to secure SOAP messages. 
However, there are also some weak points that have been 
identified, named as XML signature wrapping attacks, which 
have been categorized into  four major groups; Simple Ancestry 
Context Attack, Optional element context attacks, Sibling Value 
Context Attack, Sibling Order Context. 
In this paper, two existing methods, for referencing the signed 
part of SOAP Message, named as ID referencing and XPath 
method, are analyzed and examined. In addition, a new method 
is proposed and tested, to secure the SOAP message. 
In the new method, the XML any signature wrapping attack is 
prevented by employing the concept of XML digital signature on 
the SOAP message.  The results of conducted experiments show 
that the proposed method is approximately three times faster 
than the XPath method and even a little faster than ID. 
 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, SOAP message, XML digital 
signature, Wrapping attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a  new  technology  [1],  which 
provides  greatly  ascendable resources such as bandwidth, 
hardware  and software,  to  be  utilized  as a service for 
consumers,  over the Internet.  This concept has attracted wide 
attention in all kind of industries recently [2].  One of the most 
significant advantages of using of this technology is that 
consumers can save the cost of hardware deployment, 
software license and system maintenance.  Consequently, the 
price of providing and using the systems will be reduced 
significantly. 
However, besides being absolutely beneficial, there are still 
particular unsolved problems [2], in order to implement this 
concept.  It can be said that the most important challenges in 
cloud computing are security and trust. Since the consumer’s 
data has to be released to the cloud, the system requires high 
security and safety over them.  The data in clouds could be 
very personal and sensitive and must not be unveiled to an 
unauthorized person. In cloud computing, data are threatened 
during the transition as well. This problem reduces the 
reliability of the cloud systems [3]. 
A popular protocol, which is used to exchange the data in 
cloud systems, is Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [4] 
based on Extensible Markup Language (XML) [5]. Securing 
data in SOAP messages is one of the main concerns related to 
security in cloud systems. It can be threatened by XML 
Signature wrapping attack, which causes the unveiling of 
sensitive data [6]. This attack is based on altering the structure 
of the original message from the genuine sender. Although 
some remedies have been proposed to counter this attack (ID 
referencing and XPath methods), none of them has been able 
to counter the attack completely [6], as they sign a particular 
part of an XML document. 
The solution provided in this research, uses a new method, 
namely SESoap, to provide integrity for the messages 
exchanged in a cloud system by SOAP. In this technique, 
which is less complicated, more reliable and faster than the ID 
referencing and XPath methods, the entire SOAP message is 
signed by XML digital signature, instead of signing a part of 
that. It also counters all known wrapping attacks and makes 
similar attacks impossible. 
Layout of this article is as follows. In the next section, basic 
definitions and explanations related to SOAP message and 
XML signature are given.  In the 3
rd
 section, XML signature 
wrapping attack and its four different categories are explained 
briefly. The 4
th
 section covers some of the previous researches, 
which are relevant to this topic. Proposing and describing the 
SESoap method, its analysis, and their results have been given 
in the 5
th section. Finally brief conclusions and achievements 
of this research have been given in 6
th
 section. 
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  SOAP Message 
SOAP [7], is a protocol to provide communication between 
applications. It works as a format for sending messages via 
Internet and also collaborates with the firewalls [8], [9], [7]. 
1) SOAP Building Blocks: As it is also mentioned above, 
SOAP message’s language is based on XML [8]. Moreover, it 
can be explained that the building block of SOAP is in fact a 
typical XML document, which consists of these items:  
1) Envelope: this element recognizes the XML document as a 
SOAP message.   
2) Header: this element includes the header information of a 
SOAP message. 
3) Body: this element includes the actual SOAP message 
4) Fault: Errors that occurred while processing message are 
included in this element [8], [10]. 
3) Skeleton of a SOAP Message: A typical skeleton of a 
SOAP message is shown in Fig.1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Skeleton of a SOAP message [10] 
B. XML signature 
XML signature is a technique, which is used to deliver 
reliability, integrity and message authentication, for various 
types of data [11]. By providing integrity to data, it is meant 
that once the data is signed; it cannot be altered later, without 
invalidating the signature. This technique is executed by 
employing asymmetric cryptography. The roles for signing a 
document are as follows [12]. 
]][[]][[ MEDMEDM
CCCC PRRP

  
In the formula, a message M is signed by private key and a 
public key is used to verify the signature. The reverse 
operation is allowed as well. Asymmetric encryption uses two 
keys in order to encrypt and decrypt a message, M, which are 
named private (Rc) and public (Pc) keys. XML digital 
signature employs private key and public key to sign a 
message and validate the document, respectively. When 
signing the message, signature will be attached to the original 
document, and will be sent to the receiver. It should be noted 
that the document, is not hidden, since hiding the message is 
not the aim of XML digital signature. Since asymmetric 
encryption is time consuming, a hash function (f (M)) is 
calculated over the document and the result, which is called 
digest value, is considerably smaller than the document itself. 
The result of hash function is then encrypted by private key. 
Consequently, the time passed for encrypting data is reduced 
significantly. Fig. 2 shows the structure of an XML signature. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of an XML signature [12] 
III. XML SIGNATURE WRAPPING ATTACK 
XML signature wrapping attacks are possible because of 
the fact that the signature does not convey any information to 
where the referenced element is placed [13]. This attack was 
introduced for the first time, in 2005 by McIntosh and Austel 
[14], stating different kind of this attack, including Simple 
Context, Optional Element, Optional Element in security 
header (sibling value) and Namespace injection (Sibling order) 
[14]. This attack happens in SOAP message, which transfers 
the XML document, over the Internet. 
A. Simple Ancestry Context Attack 
In Simple Ancestry Context Attack, a request’s SOAP body 
is signed by a signature, which is placed in the security header 
of the request. The recipient of the message, checks if the 
signature is correct and legalizes trust in the signing credential. 
Lastly, the recipient controls to realize whether the required 
element was actually signed, by bringing the “id” of the 
SOAP body to the ID reference, in the signature [15]. 
A typical example of this attack is shown in Fig. 3. The 
mechanism of this attack can be briefly explained in this way 
that, the SOAP body gets swapped with a malicious SOAP 
body.  The original SOAP body is placed in a <wrapper> 
element, which is situated in the SOAP header and when the 
signature is validated, the XML signature confirmation 
algorithm, begins searching for the element, which has the id 
of "CMPE", as it is stated in the <Reference> element. Finally, 
<soap:Header> Element wrapped within the <wrapper> 
element, will be found by the algorithm. Signature verification 
will be implemented on the <soap:Header>, within the 
<wrapper> element. The verification will be positive, because 
it includes the original SOAP body, which is signed by the 
sender. The SOAP message will be passed to the logic of the 
application. In the application logic procedure, only the SOAP 
body, which is straightly positioned under the SOAP header, 
will be processed. In other words, all other SOAP body 
elements will be just ignored [15]. Fig. 3 shows how this 
attack works. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Typical Simple Ancestry Context Attack [16] 
B. Optional Element Context Attacks 
In Optional Element Context Attacks, the signed data is 
contained in the SOAP header and it is arbitrary. Comparing 
this attack to the Simple Context Attack, which is explained 
above, reveals that the main problem is not the place of the 
signed data in the SOAP header [9]. In fact, the optional 
nature of signed data is the main issue [14]. The <ReplyTo> 
element, which specifies where to send the reply, can be given 
as an example, which is shown in Fig. 4. The mechanism of 
this attack can be explained as follows; it can be seen that the 
element of <wsa:ReplyTo> is placed in the <wrapper> 
element, while, the element of <wrapper> is also positioned 
underneath the <wsse:security>. In addition, by means of 
soap:mustUnderstand="0", in <wrapper>, this element has 
become optional and by using soap:role=".../none", it is 
destined that the SOAP node (application logic) should not 
process this header element. These modifications in the SOAP 
message, result in the <wsa:ReplyTo> to become completely 
disregarded by the application’s logic. Having these 
attributions, when the signature gets legalized, the verification 
algorithm of XML signature begins to search for the element, 
which has the id of "theReplyTo" (specified in the 
<Reference>) and <wsa:ReplyTo>, which is in the <wrapper> 
element, will be found. At this stage, signature confirmation 
will be done on the <wsa:ReplyTo>, in the <wrapper>, and 
because it is including the original <wsa:ReplyTo>, signature 
confirmation will be positive. Consequently, SOAP message 
body and the descendants, which are understood, will be 
handed to the application logic while the <wrapper>, will not 
be passed to it. Thus, the application logic will ignore the 
<wsa:ReplyTo> element and as the result, the reply will not 
go to the address specified in <wsa:ReplyTo> and the original 
message sender will get the reply [9]. 
C. Sibling Value Context Attack 
Sibling Value Context Attack covers the following scenario. 
In this attack, the security header includes a signed element, 
which is in fact an alternative sibling of <Signature>. A 
common model for this attack can be the element of 
<Timestamp>, which together with <Signature>, are direct 
descendants of SOAP security header. The difference between 
this attack and the previously discussed attacks is in the signed 
data, which in this attack is the sibling of <Signature> [16]. 
The main aim of this attack is to ignore the sibling of the 
signature element. 
D. Sibling Order Context 
According to McIntoch and Austel, 2005[14], this attack is 
dealing with the protection of the sibling elements that are 
individually signed. 
Their semantics are related to their order relative to one 
another, from reordering by an adversary. More work is 
required to define appropriate countermeasures that do not 
prevent the addition and removal of siblings that do not 
impact the ordering semantics [14]. 
 
 
IV. KNOWN COUNTERMEASURES TO WRAPPING ATTACKS 
The requirements of a service-side security policy, in order 
to detect an attack were shown by McIntosh and Austell, 2005 
[14]. These necessities are being improved by each attack, 
which is able to bypass the previous provided security policy. 
In continuance, some of the improvements in the policy will 
be explained. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Typical Optional element context attack [14] 
1) In the wsse:security  header element, a signature “A” , 
XML signature, should be placed, having a clear soap:role 
attribute and value of “…/ultimateReceiver”. 
2) From signature “A”, the element, identified by 
/soap:Envelope/soap:Body, must be referenced. 
3) In the case of having any elements, which are matching 
with  
/soap:envelop/soap:Header/wsse:Security[@role=”…/ultim
ateReceiver”] wsu:Timestamp and 
/soap:Envelop/soap:Header/wsa:ReplyTo, it should be noted 
that these elements must be referred through an absolute path, 
Xpath expression, from signature “A”. 
4) Verification key of signature “A” must be issued and 
provided by a trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) and the 
certificate of X.509v3, respectively [14]. 
The first example of XML signature wrapping attack, 
which was indicating that the controls suggested by McIntosh 
and Austell [14] are not satisfactory to notice XML signature 
wrapping attack, was shown by Gruschka and Lo Iacono, in 
2009 [17]. It is also claimed in their research that the 
timestamp has to be referenced by an extra XPath expression, 
which is not fulfilled in Fig. 4. Although, it can be added 
easily, it should be noted that the XPath references result in 
further problems. It is known that XPath expressions are more 
difficult to be evaluated, comparing to IDs, this issue is 
especially important in the context of streaming SOAP 
message. Another more important issue is that employment of 
XPath references may indicate security issues, so they are not 
suggested by basic security profile [6]. 
In a new method [18], which was proposed in 2006 and is 
named as inline method, a new element called SOAP account 
was introduced. Some characteristic information are gathered 
together and inserted in the SOAP account element [17]. 
Protection of some key features of SOAP message structure is 
aimed in this technique. The properties, which are aimed to be 
protected, are listed as below. 
1) Number of header element descendants 
2) Number of soap:envelop, descendent elements 
3) Amount of references in every signature 
4) The descendants and antecedents of every signed item 
By means of this approach, with the above properties, if in 
an attack, each of these properties is changed, the attack will 
be easily identified [18]. 
The main problem with this method is that it does not 
provide a general protection, from XML signature wrapping 
attack. In other words, if an attacker manages to change the 
SOAP message structure in a way that the inline method 
structure properties does not get changed, this technique can 
be easily dodged [19]. 
In addition, fastXPath method was proposed by Gajek et al., 
in 2009 [9]. This method is employed to increase the speed of 
XPath function, and to point to the signed subtree. However, 
this method also could not solve the identified issues about 
XPath expression [20].  A comparison between runtime of 
different methods, ID, fastXPath and XPath methods, have 
been also done in their investigation. The comparison’s 
relevant graph is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Runtime comparison of different referencing methods [17] 
V. SIGNING ENTIRE SOAP (SESOAP) METHOD  
Since most of the XML signature wrapping attacks are 
done through changing the structure of the original SOAP 
message, sent by the genuine sender [17], it is logical to 
propose a protecting method, which aims to protect the 
structure of the sent message, from attacker. To fulfil this aim, 
the digital signature can be used to guarantee the integrity of 
message. 
The method of this paper, i.e. Signing Entire SOAP 
(SESoap) method, is to apply the digital signature structure 
over entire SOAP envelop element, which results in securing 
the whole document. Consequently, an attacker will not be 
able to change the location of elements or remove or add any 
element to the original document.  In the case of modification 
in any part of the document, the signature cannot be verified. 
The skeleton of SESoap method is shown in Fig. 7. 
It should be noted that the element of SOAP:signature, 
contains the result of signing the entire content of 
soap:envelop, except the element of soap:signature itself. To 
explain better, the structure of SOAP after applying the 
SESoap method is shown in Fig. 6. 
A. Simple Element Context Attack Countering 
In simple Context attack, a wrapper alters the location of 
the Soap body and adds a new Soap body to threaten the 
SOAP document [14]. It is quite clear that by using digital 
signature over entire document, any alteration or adding any 
element to the signed document will be totally prevented. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Skeleton of SESoap method 
B. Optional Element Context Attack Countering 
In Optional Element Context attack, a wrapper adds some 
information to optional element to application logic of a 
program could not parse that element [14]. Again, the same as 
the previous attack, when a wrapper tends to add something to 
the document, the attack is prevented by SESoap. 
C. Sibling Value Context Attack Countering 
The two previous types of attacks are possible to be 
prevented by means of XPath method [14]; however XPath is 
susceptible against this attack [6]. As it has been explained in 
the previous section, Time stamp element, which is an 
optional sibling element of signature element, can be 
threatened by wrapper. But for wrapping on this element, the 
wrapper again must modify some parts of document [14]. 
Consequently, as modifications are prevented in SESoap 
method, Sibling Value Context attack will not be allowed to 
occur. 
D. Sibling Order Attack Countering 
This attack relies on changing the order of individual 
sibling elements [14]. Therefore, since reordering is also not 
possible in SESoap, again no wrapper can be successful in 
implementation of this attack. 
E. Conducted Experiments 
SESoap method has been implemented by using C#.net, in 
order to determine how fast it is, comparing to the previous 
methods of ID referencing and XPath. These examinations 
have been performed by means of Laptop, having 2.00 GHz 
Core2Duo CPU, and 1.00 GB memory, in Windows7 
operating system. The time for finding the element in SESoap 
is zero, because this technique does not search for any 
specified element inside the SOAP document. Experiments 
were conducted on file sizes used in [17] and also on more 
than ten times greater size (up to 3.15 MB). The graph for 
comparing these time durations is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Time durations of the ID and XPath methods 
    In the next step, the time durations for hashing the 
specified element inside the SOAP document, have been 
estimated. Fig. 8 shows the result of the hashing specified 
element. 
    In addition, the consumed time for encrypting data, in all 
the three methods are the same, because in the digital 
signature, encryption function applies on the signed info 
element of signature. The sizes of the signed info element in 
all the methods are equal. As the result, the consumed times 
for encrypting the signed info elements are the same. In this 
study the time consumed for all three methods was 3.0004 
milliseconds. In this study, two codes have been used to 
measure the time, in Code1 each function (Finding element, 
hash function and encryption function) has been done 
separately and in Code2 the whole operations have been done 
as one component. The total times consumed to sign the soap 
message in each of the three methods, using Code1, are shown 
in Fig. 9 [21]. 
According to these results, ID is faster than XPath, in finding 
an element.  On the other hand, ID and XPath methods are 
faster, comparing to SESoap method, in hashing the specified 
element. Moreover, as the numbers show, the total consumed 
time to sign a SOAP document by SESoap method is 
approximately three times faster than the XPath method and 
even a little faster than ID.  Consequently, it can be claimed 
that, the SESoap method is operating more sufficiently, than 
the other two methods, considering both aspects of security 
and time. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Time durations for hashing the specified element 
Moreover, the total time durations in order to sign soap 
message, using Code 2, is shown in Fig. 10.     
 
 
Fig. 9 Total time durations consumed to sign the soap message, using Code 1    
These results are more complying with the previous research 
[17], but as it can be obviously noticed, the results of that 
research are less efficient than what is done in this study. 
 
Fig. 10 Total time durations consumed to sign the SOAP message, using Code 
2 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of this study was to secure SOAP 
message, which is employed to exchange information between 
web applications of cloud computing systems. Having this 
aim, a new method, SESoap, has been proposed. The concept 
of this method is using Digital Signature technique to immune 
the information inside a SOAP message from modification by 
an adversary. 
The results obtained from implementation of SESoap 
method indicate that this method is slower than the other 
examined methods, for hashing the information.  The reason 
of this observation is that, comparing to the other examined 
methods, in this method, the hash function is applied over a 
greater size of data. On the other hand, for finding element in 
SOAP message, SESoap does not consume any time and the 
total time duration for signing the message, is approximately 
three times faster than the XPath method and even a little 
faster than ID. 
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